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RECOURSE AGAINST JUDGMENTS IN THE NETHERLANDS 
 
C.H. van Rhee
1
 
 
Abbreviations 
HR: Court of Cassation/Supreme Court (Hoge Raad der Nederlanden) 
NJ: Dutch Law Reports (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie) 
NRv: Proposed changes in the Code of Civil Procedure (Bill 24 651) 
par.: paragraph (lid) 
Rb: Court of First Instance/Trial Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank) 
RO: Code on Judicial Organisation (Wet op de Rechterlijke Organisatie) 
Rv: Code of Civil Procedure (Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering) 
TK: Bill introduced at the Lower House of Parliament. 
W: Weekly Law Reports (Weekblad van het Recht) 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Courts in the Netherlands 
The main courts of first instance (Trial Courts) in the Netherlands are the Kantongerecht and the 
Arrondissementsrechtbank. In civil cases, the Kantongerecht has jurisdiction over (a) claims of 
5000 guilders or less and (b) specific types of action, such as those concerning labour contracts 
and the lease of property.
2
 The Arrondissementsrechtbank takes cognizance of, inter alia, all 
civil actions at first-instance, i.e. at the trial level, which by law have not been assigned to 
another court.
3
 Additionally, the Arrondissementsrechtbank is a court of appeal for cases judged 
at first instance by the Kantongerecht.
4
 
 The Gerechtshof is mainly a court of appeal for cases tried before the 
Arrondissementsrechtbank
5
 and for those adjudicated in summary proceedings (kort geding) 
before the President of the Arrondissementsrechtbank.
6
 The Hoge Raad der Nederlanden 
(‘Supreme Court of the Netherlands’) is the court of cassation.
7
 
 
1.2 Reforms in the fields of judicial organisation and procedure 
In the 80s, the Netherlands witnessed the start of a comprehensive programme of reform in the 
fields of judicial organisation and procedure. The reform programme consists of three stages, of 
which the first has now been completed. This has, amongst other things, resulted in the 
consolidation of several administrative procedures which were formerly adjudicated by different 
judicial bodies, in the Arrondissementsrechtbank. Consequently, the Arrondissementsrechtbank 
                     
     1. The author would like to thank Professor William Burnham, Wayne State University Law 
School (Detroit), for reviewing the English of the final draft of this report. 
     2. Arts. 38 et seq. RO. 
     3. Arts. 53 and 55a RO. 
     4. Art. 54 sub 2
o
 RO. 
     5. Art. 69 RO. 
     6. Art. 295 par. 2 Rv. 
     7. Art. 95 RO. 
has obtained extensive administrative jurisdiction together with its jurisdiction in civil and 
criminal cases. 
 As part of the reforms in the second stage, a bill has been submitted to Parliament which 
contains changes in the court structure. It is proposed to abolish the Kantongerecht and to 
reallocate its jurisdiction to the Arrondissementsrechtbank, transforming the latter court into a 
general first-instance court. In addition, the bill contains changes in the Code of Civil Procedure. 
It is unlikely that all of the proposed changes will be enacted due to opposition from various 
persons and bodies. The Kantongerecht will most likely be maintained. 
 In the present report the current situation (January 1998) will be discussed. The proposed 
changes of the second stage will be mentioned as far as they concern the means of recourse in 
civil cases. These references, however, will not be numerous, since it has been the aim of the 
legislature to reform the regulations concerning recourse in a separate bill. This bill is currently 
being prepared. It will be introduced as part of the third stage of reform. 
 
1.3 Types of recourse 
Means of recourse are available either in the very court in which the challenged decision was 
rendered or in higher courts. ‘Opposition’ (verzet), ‘revision’ (revisie), ‘third-party opposition’ 
(derdenverzet) and ‘requête civile’ (request civiel) are available in the same court, whereas 
appeal (appel) and cassation (cassatie) are means of recourse in a higher court. Leave to file 
these types of recourse is not required. ‘Cassation in the interest of the law’ (cassatie in het 
belang der wet) is a form of recourse which is not available to the original litigants but only to 
the Procurator-General in the cassation court. ‘Cassation in the interest of the law’ does not 
affect the rights of the original parties to the suit, but is only in the interest of the development 
of the law. 
 The distinction between ordinary and extra-ordinary means of recourse is important, 
since only the former means result in a stay of execution (unless the challenged decision 
contains a clause declaring the judgment immediately enforceable, i.e. uitvoerbaar bij 
voorraad
8
; this clause cannot be included by the judge on his own motion, but has to be 
requested by a party). 
 The ordinary means of recourse are opposition, appeal, cassation and revision, and the 
extraordinary ones are third-party opposition and ‘requête civile’. ‘Cassation in the interest of 
the law’ is occasionally classified as extraordinary, although due to its unique character it seems 
better not to classify it under the heading of ‘ordinary’ or ‘extra-ordinary’. ‘Cassation in the 
interest of the law’ and revision will not be discussed here, since they are of limited importance 
to the legal practictioner.
9
 (Revision will be abolished as a result of the proposed reforms in the 
Code of Civil Procedure.
10
) 
 
1.4 Two types of civil proceedings 
The two principal ways to commence a civil action under Dutch law are by way of summonses 
and by way of petition. This results in two different types of procedure, known as the ‘procedure 
on summonses’ (dagvaardingsprocedure) and the ‘petition procedure’ 
(verzoekschriftprocedure). Both at first instance (i.e. at the trial level) and on appeal, the manner 
of proceeding is affected by this distinction. The existence of the two procedures is related to the 
fact that two categories of civil cases may be distinguished: those in which the legal 
consequences may be determined by the parties (e.g. cases concerning contracts) and those in 
                     
     8. Art. 52 Rv. 
     9. For an extensive study on ‘cassation in the interest of the law’, see W.H.B. den Hartog 
Jager, Cassatie in het belang der wet: een buitengewoon rechtsmiddel, Arnhem 1994. 
     10. TK 1995-1996, 24 651, no. 1, p. 73. 
which they may not (e.g. cases for appointment of a guardian). In principle, the former type of 
cases, which are usually contentious, should be commenced by summonses and the latter, which 
are usually non-contentious, by petition, although this distinction is not strictly adhered to. 
 Terminology in the Code of Civil Procedure often indicates when an action should be 
commenced by summonses or petition. In the former case, the word vordering is used, whereas 
in the latter case the terms verzoek or verzoekschrift appear. Where necessary, differences in the 
procedure on recourse resulting from the manner in which an action is commenced will be 
mentioned below. 
 
2 APPEAL 
 
2.1 Jurisdiction on appeal 
 
Kantongerecht 
In actions commenced by summonses before the Kantongerecht, the right of appeal is precluded 
where the claim does not exceed 2,500 guilders.
11
 This amount will become 5000 guilders if the 
Kantongerecht becomes part of the Arrondissementsrechtbank as a result of the programme of 
reform discussed above.
12
 Proceedings commenced by petition do not contain a similar 
limitation of appeal. 
 Where a single plaintiff brings several claims against the same defendant in a single case, 
the possibility of appeal is determined by the aggregate value of the individual claims, even 
where they are not related.
13
 Appeal is also possible if the plaintiff wishes to challenge a 
judgment because part of his claims have been denied, even though the value of this part is 
2,500 guilders or less. This is due to the fact that the value of the entire claim at first instance 
determines the possibility of appeal.
14
 Claims and counter-claims may be aggregated in order to 
determine whether appeal is available.
15
 
 Where several plaintiffs bring an action in a single case or where an action is brought 
against several defendants, the value of the claims may not be aggregated; under such 
circumstances each claim must be evaluated individually in order to determine whether or not 
appeal is allowed.
16
 
 If during proceedings before the Kantongerecht the claim is reduced to 2,500 guilders or 
less, appeal is not allowed, since the elegibility for appeal is determined by the amount of the 
claim which has been the subject of the judgment.
17
 The same rule makes it possible to appeal 
of a judgment concerning a claim which has been increased during the proceedings before the 
Kantongerecht, resulting in its value becoming more than 2,500 guilders.
18
 
 The ancillary claims for costs, interest and astreinte (a penalty imposed on a daily basis 
in case of non-compliance or a fine imposed per contravening act) do not affect the value of the 
claim as far as appeal is concerned. An exception to this rule is interest which became due 
before the action was brought; such interest is taken into account in determining the value of the 
                     
     11. Arts. 38 and 39 RO. 
     12. Art. 332 NRv. 
     13. HR 17-05-1946, NJ 1946, 433. 
     14. HR 21-12-1933, NJ 1934, 1025 and W 12782. 
     15. Art. 253 par. 1 Rv. 
     16. HR 12-06-1953, NJ 1954, 61. 
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Utrecht 1996, no. 25. 
claim.
19
 The latter rule, which currently cannot be found in the Code of Civil Procedure, will be 
codified by new legislation.
20
 
 The parties may agree to waive the right of appeal.
21
 
 
Arrondissementsrechtbank 
The value of the claim is of no importance for the right to appeal judgments of the 
Arrondissementsrechtbank. Unless forbidden by law, the first-instance judgments of this court 
are subject to appeal.
22
 An example where appeal is excluded are actions adjudicated by the 
Arrondissementsrechtbank because the defendant did not seek removal of the case to the 
Kantongerecht even though this was the proper court competent to hear the action.
23
 
Accordingly, in such a case the omission to seek removal results in a loss of the right to appeal. 
It should, however, be remembered that the cassation court has decided that even where by 
statute appeal (and cassation) of particular types of decision has been excluded, appeal (and 
cassation) is nevertheless allowed where it is claimed that the provision prohibitting recourse: 
1. has been applied unjustly; 
2. has been applied in contravention of essential formalities; 
3. has been ignored unjustly.
24
 
 As in cases before the Kantongerecht, parties may agree to waive their right of appeal.
25
 
 
2.2 Procedure, scope and consequences of appeal 
Appeal can be filed by litigants who have lost their case at first instance in whole or in part, and 
only one appeal may be brought. The litigant seeking the appeal is termed appellant, whereas 
his opponent is known as geïntimeerde. The procedure on appeal is essentially a ‘second first 
instance’.
26
 An important difference between the first-instance procedure and the procedure on 
appeal is, however, the number of pleadings (conclusions) each party may submit in actions 
commenced by summonses. While in first-instance proceedings before the 
Arrondissementsrechtbank the claim and the defence are followed by a replication and a 
rejoinder, on appeal only a complaint (known as conclusie van eis or memorie van grieven) and 
an answer (termed conclusie van antwoord or memorie van antwoord) are allowed.
27
 
 The appellate court has all the power and jurisdiction of the court from which the appeal 
was brought. In Dutch law, this is styled the devolutive effect of appeal. As a result, both errors 
of fact and of law may be corrected on appeal. All aspects of the challenged part of the first-
instance judgment are considered by the appellate court (tantum devolutum quantum 
appellatum).
28
 As a result, this court may also deal with questions raised during litigation at first 
instance that have not been decided by the court of first instance.
29
 
 On appeal, the appellant may not only submit his objections to the first-instance 
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     28. HR 16-12-1926, NJ 1927, p. 263 and W. 11612. 
     29. HR 16-11-1951, NJ 1952, 62. 
judgment, but he may also correct his own acts or ommissions in conducting the case before the 
lower court.
30
  
 In actions commenced by summonses, the appellant who acted as plaintiff at first 
instance may change his original claim. The adverse party may oppose the change on the 
grounds that it would unreasonably hinder his defence or delay the proceedings.
31
 The opponent 
cannot oppose a reduction of the claim.
32
 In default cases only a reduction of the claim is 
allowed.
33
 A change of the claim on appeal, however, may not result in the 
Arrondissementsrechtbank adjudicating an appeal case which cannot be judged at first instance 
by the Kantonrechter.
34
 In actions commenced by petition, the claim may only be changed with 
the court’s consent.
35
 
 In principle, the adverse party may introduce a new defence on the merits in proceedings 
on appeal.
36
 
 As a result of the above regulations, the appellate court will sometimes entertain 
questions which were not raised during litigation at first instance. 
 A litigant who failed to produce witnesses at first instance, can do this on appeal, with the 
exception of those witnesses whom at first instance he formally declared he would not 
produce.
37
 
 The appellate court may either receive evidence at the request of a party or on its own 
motion.
38
 This subject is mainly governed by the rules laid down for the procedure at first 
instance.
39
 
 The scope of an appeal is determined by the summons on appeal or the petition and the 
writings filed by the litigants. It should be noted that unlike the summons at first instance, the 
summons served on appeal does not have to contain the grounds on which the appeal is based.
40
 
In practice, grounds are not included in summonses on appeal. A petition invoking appeal 
proceedings should, however, contain grounds.
41
 
 The introduction of an appeal results in a stay of execution, unless the first-instance 
court, on a motion of one of the parties, has declared its judgment enforceable even if it is 
challenged in a manner which would otherwise result in a stay of execution (uitvoerbaar bij 
voorraad).
42
 
 Even after expiration of the term allowed for filing an appeal, the opponent of the 
original appellant may bring a cross-appeal. This should be done in answer to the claim on 
appeal and is only possible if the challenged judgment is (partly) against him.
43
 
                     
     30. HR 17-02-1978, NJ 1978, 623. 
     31. Art. 347 par. 1 j
o
 134 Rv. Cf. Art. 2.4.6 NRv. For proceedings before the Kantonrechter, 
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     39. Art. 353 Rv. For actions commenced by petition, see Arts. 182 and 429q par. 6 Rv. 
     40. Art. 343 par. 1 Rv. 
     41. Art. 429o j
o
 429d Rv. 
     42. Art. 350 par. 1 Rv. For proceedings commenced by petition, see Art. 429p Rv. 
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 A cross-appeal on grounds not raised at first instance is not allowed.
44
 
 Appeal may not result in a reformatio in peius, that is to say, it may not lead to a less 
favourable decision than that pronounced at first instance.
45
 
 
2.3 Appeal of interlocutory judgments in actions commenced by summonses 
 
Types of interlocutory rulings 
Dutch law distinguishes various types of ‘interlocutory decisions’: ‘preparatory judgments’, 
‘provisional judgments’, ‘incidental judgments’ and ‘interlocutory judgments sensu stricto’. 
These distinctions will be abolished by future legislation, which only provides for provisional 
and other interlocutory decisions (see below). 
 A preparatory judgment is a ruling affecting the manner of proceeding in a particular 
case. This ruling does not, in principle, affect the way in which the case will be decided.
46
 An 
example of a preparatory judgment is where a joinder of cases is allowed or refused.
47
 A 
decision postponing final judgment is also a preparatory judgment, unless the postponement is 
necessary to await the judgment in another lawsuit which may affect the decision in the 
postponed proceedings.
48
 In the latter case, the judgment is ‘interlocutory sensu stricto’. 
 An ‘interlocutory judgment sensu stricto’ regulates the nature of proceedings in a case in 
such a manner that it may affect the final decision of the court.
49
 Examples are where the court 
orders (1) the hearing of witnesses or experts, (2) a judicial inspection of premises, or (3) an 
appearance of the parties in order to inform the court on particular issues. 
 Provisional judgments contain provisional measures.
50
 These measures no longer apply 
once the last judgment in the case on the merits has obtained force of res judicata (a decision 
obtains res judicata-force when no ordinary means of recourse can be brought against it or if the 
period for bringing such means has expired
51
). 
 Incidental judgments are all interlocutory rulings (sensu lato) other than those above.
52
 
Examples of claims resulting in an ‘incidental judgment’ are prayers for (1) the service of third 
party notices (vrijwaring), (2) security, and (3) désaveu (a disclaimer for acts performed by legal 
counsel). 
 
Rules for appeal of interlocutory rulings 
Preparatory judgments may only be appealed after final judgment has been entered. This appeal 
should be combined with appeal of the final judgment; that is to say, when the final judgment is 
not challenged, appeal of a preparatory judgment is not allowed.
53
 
 Appeal of a provisional judgment is possible before final judgment has been pronounced. 
If an appeal has not been filed before final judgment, however, this is again possible together 
with an appeal of the final judgment.
54
 
                     
     44. Art. 250 par. 2 Rv. 
     45. HR 14-10-1988, NJ 1989, 78. 
     46. Art. 46 par. 3 Rv. Cf. HR 03-01-1975, NJ 1975, 455. 
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     48. HR 18-05-1962, NJ 1965, 115. 
     49. Art. 46 par. 4 Rv. 
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     51. Cf. Y.E.M. Beukers, Eenmaal andermaal? Beschouwingen over gezag van gewijsde en 
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     52. Incidental rulings are mentioned in Arts. 337 and 401a Rv. 
     53. Art. 336 par. 1 Rv. 
     54. Art. 337 par. 1 Rv is usually interpreted in this way. 
 The same possibilities exist regarding incidental and interlocutory judgments (sensu 
stricto), unless these rulings contain a clause which stipulates that appeal is only possible 
together with an appeal of the final judgment.
55
 
 Despite the above rules, all types of interlocutory judgments (sensu lato) may be 
challenged before final judgment if this is done simultaneously with an appeal of a later 
interlocutory judgment (sensu lato) which may immediately be appealed of.
56
 
 If the appellate court approves an incidental, provisional or an interlocutory judgment 
(sensu stricto), it has to remand the case on the merits to the original court of first instance. On 
request of the parties, however, the appellate court itself may decide the case on the merits. The 
court may also do this of its own motion if it finds that the case is sufficiently prepared for final 
judgment (évocation).
57
 
 If the appellate court reverses an ‘interlocutory judgment sensu stricto’ of a court of first 
instance, it may decide the case on the merits as well,
58
 but it can also, in its discretion, remand 
the case to the original first-instance court.
59
 If the court decides to adjudicate the case on the 
merits itself, it deprives the litigants of the possibility of appeal of its judgment, which 
nevertheless under such circumstances is a first-instance judgment. 
 Where the appellate court reverses an incidental or provisional ruling, it is only allowed 
to adjudicate the case on the merits where the parties so wish. This is different if the case is 
sufficiently prepared for final judgment, because then the court may decide to adjudicate the 
case on the merits on its own motion.
60
 
 From the above examples it appears that an appellate court, handling an ‘interlocutory 
appeal’ (sensu lato), can under certain circumstances decide points of substance between the 
parties. 
 Appeal of interlocutory or incidental judgments results in a stay of the case on the merits. 
If the judge in the case on the merits nevertheless pronounces judgment, this judgment may only 
be annulled on appeal.
61
 
 As mentioned above, the proposed new legislation only distinguishes between 
‘provisional’ and other interlocutory decisions. Under the new law, provisional judgments may 
be appealed of before final judgment. The same rule applies to the other interlocutory 
judgments, unless the court rules that an appeal is only allowed together with an appeal of the 
final judgment.
62
 
 
2.4 Appeal of interlocutory judgments (sensu lato) in actions commenced by petition 
Appeal is not allowed, unless the court has decided otherwise in its interlocutory decision.
63
 
 
2.5 Interlocutory judgments containing final decisions 
The above rules regarding appeals of interlocutory judgments (sensu lato) do not apply when 
these judgments also contain final decisions (deelvonnissen). In that case the final part of the 
judgment should immediately be appealed, even if the lower judge has excluded an intermediate 
                     
     55. Art. 337 par. 2 Rv. 
     56. HR 30-06-1967, NJ 1968, 43. 
     57. Art. 355 Rv. 
     58. Art. 356 par. 1 Rv. 
     59. HR 02-01-1942, NJ 1942, 294. 
     60. Art. 356 par. 2 Rv. 
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appeal.
64
 The litigants or their counsel should, therefore, review interlocutory judgments with 
care. 
 
2.6 Appeal of a final judgment does not necessarily imply appeal of preceding 
interlocutory decisions 
Where an appeal has been filed against a final judgment and not against a preceding 
interlocutory judgment (sensu lato) and where no complaints against the interlocutory judgment 
are made, the appellate judge is (in principle) bound by the interlocutory decision.
65
 
 
3 CASSATION 
 
3.1 General observations 
The basis of the jurisdiction of the court of cassation can be found in the Constititution.
66
 
 Cassation can be brought against (1) first-instance judgments which are not subject to 
appeal and (2) appellate judgments.
67
 The same rule applies to interlocutory judgments. 
Cassation is not allowed where another type of recourse is or has been available, unless after the 
disputed judgment has been entered, the parties agree to forego proceedings on appeal in order 
to commence the cassation proceeding immediately (sprongcassatie).
68
 Even after expiration of 
the time period allowed for cassation, the opponent of the litigant having commenced cassation 
proceedings may file a cross-cassation.
69
 This should be done in the response to the cassation 
complaint
70
 and is only possible if the challenged judgment is (partly) against the opponent. In 
proceedings commenced by petition, cross-cassation is also possible.
71
 Cassation results in a 
stay of execution, unless the lower court, on a motion of a party, has declared that its judgment 
is enforceable even if it is challenged in a manner which would otherwise result in a stay of 
execution (uitvoerbaar bij voorraad).
72
 
 The cassation court is bound by the facts which have been established by the lower 
court.
73
 These facts appear from the challenged judgment and the other documents included in 
the case-file.
74
  
 Cassation proceedings may be commenced whenever: 
(1) the lower court has not observed formalities which must be observed on penalty of nullity of 
its decision; and 
(2) errors of law, both procedural and substantive, with the exception of the law of foreign 
states, have been made.
75
 
 
Ad 1. The most important example of a deficiency in the observance of formalities is where the 
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court below fails to adequately explain its decision. This occurs not only where an explanation 
is absent, but also where the explanation is incomprehensible or contradictory.
76
 A deficiency in 
the explanation is also present where the judgment appears to be the result of a mistake.
77
 
 
Ad 2. The ground ‘errors of law’ also comprises errors in the interpretation of unwritten law, 
such as customary law and the unwritten rules of private international law.
78
 
 
These grounds do not apply to cassation proceedings brought against first-instance judgments of 
the Kantongerecht against which appeal is not allowed. These judgments may only be 
challenged by way of cassation if: 
(a) the challenged judgment does not state the grounds on which it is based; 
(b) the challenged judgment was not pronounced in public (this cassation ground is not 
applicable to judgments passed in actions commenced by petition
79
); 
(c) the Kantongerecht lacked jurisdiction in the particular case; 
(d) the Kantongerecht has exceeded its jurisdiction
80
. 
 
The interpretation of ‘declarations of will’ such as contracts has long been regarded as factual 
and, therefore, outside the scope of cassation. However, this approach has changed. The 
interpretation of ‘declarations of will’ is currently regarded as not only consisting of the 
determination of the subjective will of the persons involved, but also of the objective meaning 
of their declaration. Therefore, the interpretation of declarations of will is brought within the 
scope of cassation.
81
 It seems, however, that the cassation court limits itself to phrasing general 
rules regarding interpretation. It does not determine the consequences of these rules for the 
particular case under consideration, but leaves this decision to the lower court where the case is 
remanded after cassation.
82
 
 As mentioned above, the application of foreign law by the lower court is outside the 
scope of cassation. Nevertheless, if the lower judge has clearly erred in interpreting foreign law, 
the cassation court may reverse a judgment on the basis of deficiencies in the justification for 
the decision, for example where the decision is evidently in contravention to the statutory law of 
the foreign country concerned.
83
 
 In many cases the cassation court abstains from examining whether the legal 
characterisation of particular facts by the lower court is correct. This occurs most frequently 
where the lower court has applied vague legal concepts. These concepts have in common that 
they cannot be precisely defined, leaving it, within certain limits, to the lower judge to 
determine whether the rule containing the concept should be applied in the particular case (ius 
in causa positum). 
 Cases where inferences of fact by the lower court are found insufficient, resulting in the 
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judgment being reversed, are few.
84
 
 The sufficiency of the proofs accepted by the lower court is regarded as factual and, 
therefore, not subject to cassation. 
 Occasionally, complaints in cassation do not lead to the challenged decision being 
reversed even though the complaint is justified. This occurs where the litigant seeking reversal 
lacks interest in cassation. The most important examples are where the cassation court decides 
that: 
- the decision of the lower court is correct on legal grounds other than the ones advanced in the 
judgment;
85
 
- the court to which the case would be remanded after cassation would reach the same decision 
as the challenged one on the basis of the facts of the case;
86
 
- certain grounds of the challenged judgment have not been challenged adequately, even though 
they are sufficient grounds for this judgment.
87
 
 Where the cassation court vacates the decision of the lower court, it should, in principle, 
decide the case under consideration itself.
88
 This rule was adopted at the introduction of 
cassation in the 19
th
-century Netherlands. It resulted in Dutch cassation differing from its French 
example.  
 The cassation court, however, may not decide the case itself where a supplementary 
examination of the facts is deemed necessary, unless the point at issue is of minor importance 
and can be established on the basis of the case-file.
89
 Where points of law remain to be decided, 
the court can adjudicate the action itself or remand the case to a lower court.
90
 Where a case is 
remanded, the court whose judgment has been reversed takes cognisance of the action.
91
 The 
lower court is bound by the decision of the cassation court.
92
 
 The following goals of cassation are generally accepted in the Netherlands: 
- promotion of unity in (the application of) the law and of legal security; 
- promotion of development in the law; 
- supervision of the quality of the administration of justice. 
 
3.2 Cassation against interlocutory judgments 
The rules for cassation against interlocutory judgments (sensu lato) in actions commenced by 
either summonses or petition are equal to those of appeal of interlocutory judgments in actions 
commenced by summonses (see above).
93
 Where an interlocutory judgment is reversed, the 
cassation court may decide to remand the case to the court of first instance instead of to the 
appellate court whose decision on appeal of an interlocutory judgment has been reversed.
94
 
 
4 RECOURSE AGAINST DEFAULT JUDGMENTS 
                     
     84. An example is HR 25-09-1981, NJ 1982, 254. 
     85. Losbladige Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering, "Cassatie", Art. 398 Rv, aant. 6 (E. Korthals 
Altes). 
     86. HR 06-10-1989, NJ 1990, 323. 
     87. HR 18-06-1971, NJ 1971, 454. 
     88. Art. 420 Rv. For actions commenced by petition, Art. 429 par. 2 j
o
 420 Rv. 
     89. Art. 421 Rv. For actions commenced by petition, Art. 429 par. 2 j
o
 421 Rv. 
     90. Art. 422 Rv. For actions commenced by petition, Art. 429 par. 2 j
o
 422 Rv. 
     91. Art. 422a Rv. For actions commenced by petition, Art. 429 par. 2 j
o
 422a Rv. 
     92. Art. 424 Rv. For actions commenced by petition, see Art. 429 par. 2 j
o
 424 Rv. 
     93. Arts. 401 and 401a Rv. For actions commenced by petition, see Arts. 426 par. 4 jis. 401 
and 401a Rv. 
     94. Art. 422a jis. 355-358 Rv. 
Default judgments may be challenged by way of appeal or cassation by the plaintiff if (1) the 
defendant has defaulted and (2) the judgment was wholy or in part against the plaintiff. The 
defaulting defendant, however, does not have appeal or cassation at his disposal. He must bring 
a motion to set aside the judgment (verzet/oppositie) if the default judgment is wholy or in part 
against him. These proceedings are commenced in the court which has entered the judgment.
95
 
A motion to set aside a judgment in summary proceedings before the President of the 
Arrondissementsrecht, however, may not be brought before the President, but should be brought 
before the Arrondissementsrechtbank.
96
 Unless allowed by statute, setting aside is not possible 
in proceedings commenced by petition. This is not detrimental to litigants who have been 
absent, since these litigants may file an appeal.
97
 
 In cases concerning several defendants, it may happen that some of them do not appear. If 
this occurs, the proceedings against the defendants who have appeared in court are postponed, 
whereas the remaining defendants are declared defaulters. Subsequently, the defendants who 
have made their appearance may have the defaulters summoned to court on the day scheduled 
for the continuation of the proceedings. Litigants who remain defaulters may not bring a motion 
to set aside the final judgment. They may, however, file an appeal after they have complied with 
this judgment. Their opponent should pledge security for repaying the defaulters if on appeal the 
ruling of the lower court is reversed. If the opponent refuses to pledge security, the defaulters 
may file an appeal without complying with the judgment.
98
 
 Judgments on appeal may also be set aside.
99
 This motion is only possible against a 
judgment of the cassation court where the complaints allege the nullity of the summons served 
in the case below or where they allege that the lower court has allowed appeal even though the 
term for appeal had expired.
100
 
 From the above rules it is apparent that default judgments can be challenged in different 
ways. It should be remembered, however, that where an appeal has been filed by the plaintiff, 
the defendant loses the right to bring a motion to set aside. The defendant may, however, file his 
own complaint in the appeal proceedings.
101
 
 Where the plaintiff challenges a default judgment by way of cassation, the defaulter may 
raise a defence in the proceedings before the cassation court.
102
 The filing of such a defence 
results in the loss of the right to bring a motion to set aside.
103
 Should the defaulter chose to 
bring such a motion after his opponent has initiated cassation proceedings, the proceedings 
before the cassation court are discontinued.
104
 
 In cases where the defaulter neither brings a motion to set aside nor files his defence in 
cassation proceedings, he retains the right to bring a motion to set aside after the cassation court 
has passed judgment, unless the term for this motion has expired.
105
 
 The litigant who has brought a motion to set aside is not required to explain the reasons 
for his default in the previous instance. 
 Setting aside results in the continuation of the case which ended with a default judgment. 
                     
     95. Art. 81 Rv. 
     96. Art. 294 Rv. 
     97. Arts. 429n and 345 Rv. 
     98. Arts. 79 and 335 par. 2 Rv. 
     99. HR 03-12-1971, NJ 1972, 69. 
     100. Art. 425 Rv. 
     101. Art. 335 par. 1 Rv. 
     102. Art. 401b par. 2 Rv. 
     103. Art. 401c par. 1 Rv.  
     104. Art. 401c par. 2 Rv. 
     105. Art. 401c par. 3 Rv. 
As such, setting aside adheres to the ‘audite-rule’.
106
 This procedure results in a stay of 
execution, unless the court, on a motion of a party, has declared that its judgment is enforceable 
even when it is challenged in a manner which would otherwise have resulted in a stay of 
execution (uitvoerbaarheid bij voorraad).
107
 
 Setting aside is even possible where the applicable statute only allows cassation against a 
decision.
108
 
 As regards appeal and cassation against a judgment obtained as a result of setting aside, 
the ordinary rules of procedure apply. 
 
5 RECOURSE AGAINST JUDGMENTS OBTAINED BY FRAUD 
A special procedure known as request civiel exists for complaints against judgments in 
proceedings commenced by summonses. It has long been held that this means of recourse is not 
allowed in proceedings commenced by petition,
109
 but recently the cassation court, anticipating 
new legislation, has changed its opinion.
110
 
 Request civiel is available against decisions at last ‘factual’ resort as well as against 
default judgments against which a motion to set aside can no longer be brought. This procedure 
is brought before the court which pronounced the disputed judgment.
111
  
 The Code of Civil Procedure enumerates a series of complaints for which request civiel 
may be brought. These complaints concern either the conduct of the opposing party in the 
preceding case
112
 or faults and omissions of the court which heard this case.
113
 The most 
important complaint of the first category is ‘fraud’ by the opponent having resulted in the 
challenged judgment. 
 The grounds for bringing a request civiel against judgments of the Kantongerecht are 
more restricted then the grounds for judgments pronounced by other courts. They solely concern 
the conduct of the opposing party in the proceedings before the lower court.
114
 
 Request civiel is not allowed against cassation judgments.
115
  
 A succesful request civiel results in the annulment of the previous judgment and in a new 
case before the same court, either at first instance or on appeal. The filing of this means of 
recourse does not give rise to a stay of execution.
116
 
 Request civiel is problematic for a variety of reasons. Regarding complaints about faults 
and omissions of the court, request civiel and cassation overlap. Furthermore, it seems 
unjustified that complaints about the conduct of the opponent can only be brought after a 
judgment at last ‘factual’ resort has been passed. It may, for example, happen that originally an 
appeal against a particular judgment did not seem necessary, whereas after the expiration of the 
term allowed for its introduction the procedural misbehaviour of the opponent came to light.  
 These and other peculiarities,
117
 have resulted in proposed legislation on the request 
                     
     106. HR 23-06-1993, 559. 
     107. Art. 82 par. 2 Rv. 
     108. HR 23-06-1993, NJ 1993, 559. 
     109. HR 09-12-1983, NJ 1984, 384. 
     110. HR 04-10-1996, RvdW 1996, 194. 
     111. Art. 389 par. 1 Rv. 
     112. Art. 382 sub 1, 7 and 8 Rv. 
     113. Art. 382 sub 2 to 6 Rv. 
     114. Art. 397 Rv j
o
 382 Rv. 
     115. HR 30-06-1989, NJ 1989, 769. 
     116. Art. 392 Rv. 
     117. Cf. TK 1995-1996, 24 651, no. 3, p. 174-175. 
civiel.
118
 The name of this means of recourse will be changed in herroeping (revocation); the 
rule that the judgment against which it is brought must be pronounced at last factual resort will 
be abolished and the new type of request civiel will also be available against judgments in 
proceedings commenced by petition. 
 Herroeping against judgments in actions commenced by summonses is only possible 
where these judgments have obtained the force of res judicata.
119
 This condition does not apply 
to judgments obtained in proceedings commenced by petition since it is unclear whether such 
judgments formally acquire such force.
120
 The grounds for bringing herroeping only address the 
procedural behaviour of the opponent in the proceedings that resulted in the disputed judgment 
or the fact that this judgment is based on false documents.
121
 
 According to the proposed legislation, herroeping does not necessarily lead to annulment 
of the contested judgment. In principle, it only results in a reopening of the case, wholy or in 
part.
122
 This reopening may of course lead to the conclusion that the challenged judgment 
should be annulled, but this is not necessarily so. 
 Reopening a case results in a stay of execution. Where a case is only partly reopened, the 
stay of execution only affects that part of the challenged decision.
123
 
 
6 THIRD PARTY OPPOSITION 
It may happen that a judgment is detrimental to the rights of persons who have not been parties 
to the suit. These persons may challenge such a judgment by way of third party opposition in the 
court which entered the judgment.
124
 This means of recourse is even available after the 
judgment has obtained the force of res judicata. It does not automatically result in a stay of 
execution, although the court hearing the third party opposition may order a stay of execution.
125
 
Where third party opposition has been successful, the challenged judgment will only be 
corrected as far as the rights of third parties are concerned, unless this is not possible, in which 
case the whole judgment will be annulled.
126
 Third party opposition is not available in 
proceedings which have been commenced by petition instead of summonses.
127
 
 
7 TIME-LIMITS FOR INTRODUCING MEANS OF RECOURSE 
 
7.1 Appeal
128
 
 
Ordinary proceedings commenced by summonses 
 
Art. 339 par. 1 Rv: within 3 months after the judgment 
 
Proceedings commenced by petition 
                     
     118. Arts. 382-391 NRv. 
     119. Art. 382 NRv. 
     120. H.J. Snijders et al., Nederlands Burgerlijk Procesrecht, Deventer 1997, p. 52.  
     121. Arts. 382 and 390 NRv. 
     122. Art. (391 NRv j
o
) 387 NRv. 
     123. Art. (391 NRv j
o
) 388 par. 1 NRv. 
     124. Arts. 376-377 Rv.  
     125. Art. 379 Rv. 
     126. Art. 380 Rv. 
     127. HR 26-11-1982, NJ 1983, 123. 
     128. The time-limits for appeal of interlocutory judgments (sensu lato), which are not 
mentioned below, may be found in Arts. 336-337 Rv and in 337 and 339 NRv. 
 
Plaintiff and litigants having made their appearance 
Art. 429n par. 2 Rv: within 2 months after the date of the judgment 
Art. 358 par. 2 NRv:  within 3 months after the day of public pronunciation of the judgment 
 
Other litigants
129
 
Art. 429n par. 2 Rv: within 2 months after the judgment has officially been notified to them 
or after it has become known to them in another manner 
Art. 358 par. 2 NRv:  within 3 months after the judgment has officially been notified to them 
or after it has become known to them in another manner 
 
Summary proceedings (kort geding) 
 
Art. 295 Rv par. 3: within 2 weeks after the judgment 
Art. 339 par. 2 NRv:  within 4 weeks after the judgment 
 
Nota bene: 
Where cassation has been commenced within the term for both appeal and cassation and where 
it is decided that cassation is not possible, a new term for appeal commences on the day of the 
decision of the cassation court.
130
 This second term does not result in a stay of execution.
131
 
 
7.2 Cassation 
 
Ordinary proceedings commenced by summonses 
 
Art. 402 par. 1 Rv: within 3 months from the date of pronunciation of the judgment 
 
Nota bene: 
Art. 402 par. 2 Rv: Where the term for appeal is shorter than the ordinary term for 
cassation, the term for cassation is double the term for appeal. 
 
Proceedings commenced by petition 
 
Litigants who have made their appearance in the previous instance(s): 
Art. 426 par. 1 Rv: within 2 months from the date of the judgment 
Art. 426 par. 1 NRv: within 3 months from the date of the judgment 
 
Litigants who have not made their appearance: 
Art. 426 par. 1 Rv (a contrario): cassation not possible 
 
Nota bene: 
Art. 426 par. 2 Rv: Where the term for appeal is shorter than the ordinary term for 
cassation, the term for cassation is double the term for appeal. 
Art. 426 par. 3 Rv: Where statute determines a moment from which the term for appeal 
starts to run other than the date of the judgment, the term for cassation 
also starts at that other moment. 
                     
     129. See also Art. 345 Rv. 
     130. Art. 340 Rv. 
     131. Art. 350 par. 2 Rv. 
 
Summary proceedings (kort geding) 
 
Art. 295 par. 4: within 6 weeks after the date of pronunciation of the challenged 
judgment 
 
7.3 Setting aside 
 
Ordinary proceedings commenced by summonses 
 
Art. 81 par. 1 Rv: within 14 days after the official notification of the judgment or a related 
instrument to the defaulter in person, or within 14 days after the 
performance of acts which necessarily imply that the defaulter has 
gained knowledge of the default judgment 
Art. 2.7.1 NRv: the term has been extended to 4 weeks (8 weeks for defaulters without 
a known place of residence within the Netherlands and whose place of 
residence outside the Netherlands is known) 
 
Nota bene: 
Art. 81 par. 2 Rv: after the judgment has been enforced, setting aside is not possible anymore. 
Art. 2.7.1 par. 3 NRv: where the term for setting aside has not commenced by any other act, it 
starts on the day of enforcement of the judgment. 
 
7.4 Request civiel 
 
Art. 385 par. 1 Rv: within 3 months after the contested judgment has been pronounced, or, 
if it concerns a default judgment, 3 months after the term for setting 
aside has expired 
 
Nota bene: 
In several cases the term of three months starts at a different moment. See Arts. 385-388 Rv. 
 
7.5 Third party opposition 
 
No term has been prescribed by law. The ordinary terms of prescription and limitation of rights 
and actions apply. 
 
8 STATISTICS 
 
Number of civil judgments in adversary proceedings (1995):
132
 
Kantongerecht: 215.700 
Arrondissementsrechtbank: 34.800 
Gerechtshof: 3.400 
Cassation court: 300 
 
Number of judges necessary to adjudicate appeal cases: 
Arrondissementsrechtbank: 3 
Gerechtshof: 3 
                     
     132. More recent figures are not yet available. 
 
Required number of judges in cassation: 5 (in uncomplicated cases 3) 
 
Number of courts: 
Kantongerecht: 61 
Arrondissementsrechtbank: 19 
Gerechtshof: 5 
Cassation court: 1 
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